Getting
to the Territorial Endgame
of
an Israeli-Palestinian
Peace
Settlement
A
Special Report by the Israeli-Palestinian Workshop of the Baker InstituteÕs
Conflict Resolution Forum
chaired
by Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/BI-pub-IPTerritorialEndgame-020210.pdf
The
Israeli-Palestinian workshop is part of the Baker InstituteÕs Conflict
Resolution Forum. Learn more about the Baker InstituteÕs conflict resolution
work, including previous reports from the Israeli-Palestinian Working Group and
the United States-Syria Dialogue, at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/conflict-resolution.
Foreword
For
the past year and a half, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at
Rice University under the aegis of its Conflict Resolution Forum hosted an
Israeli-Palestinian workshop to explore the possible contours of a final status
agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians on the territorial
components of peace. The Baker Institute convened two teams of experts, each
representing Israeli and Palestinian points of view.
The
focus of this workshop is to provide policymakers in Washington, Jerusalem and
Ramallah with the results of a Track II bottom-up approach highlighting the
differences and areas of possible agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian
positions on key issues, including Israeli settlements, borders, land swaps,
territorial contiguity, safe passage and other relevant issues. A primary
assumption of all of the parties is that the territorial component of peace
cannot be negotiated and addressed in isolation from the other final status
issues, including Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and security, as well as
significant issues such as the normalization of relations and the economic
components of peace.
Nevertheless,
the purpose of this exercise is to concentrate on the territorial component
with the assumption that if progress could be made on this critical issue, it
could facilitate forward movement in Track I negotiations on the other final
status issues. The Israeli and Palestinian teams were able to establish some
common criteria and guidelines for assessing the territorial issues and the
Israeli settlements.
Accordingly,
the two teams provided narratives and submitted different maps containing
territorial swap scenarios. An initial Israeli map suggested a territorial swap
of 7.03% each, accepting the 1:1 provision laid down in the Arab Peace
Initiative. The teams also referred to reported positions put forward by
then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. An initial Palestinian map suggested a
territorial swap, on the basis of a 1:1 exchange, of 1.9%, reflecting reported
positions put forward by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Under
the aegis of the Baker Institute, three territorial options in between these
positions of the parties were discussed. The conceptual maps with these three
territorial options were reviewed in the course of our discussions and are
included at the end of 6 Getting to the Territorial Endgame of an
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Settlement this report. The Palestinian and the Israeli
teams discussed, also, the important need to differentiate between Òspace and
timeÓ — namely, exploring the concept of phasing the dismantlement and
relocation of settlements over various periods of time.
Drawing
on the deliberations of the Israeli and Palestinian participants in this
workshop and the proposed options for a final territorial agreement, the report
finds that a United States bridging proposal on the territorial component of
peace could be introduced at the right time and, depending on actual political
circumstances, serve as a guide to enable gradual progress, step by step. The
contours of a territorial bridging proposal are outlined in this report, as
well as the need to prepare the necessary planning tools to achieve a
successful outcome.
It
is evident that the Israeli settlements are one of the most contentious issues
in any final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. The sensitivities of the
Israeli and Palestinian teams during the course of the discussions in the Baker
InstituteÕs workshop underscored this reality and the hard challenges that
official negotiators will face. Serious differences between the parties remain,
and they are reflected in the report and the appendices outlining Palestinian
and Israeli considerations and concerns. Therefore, this report does not
represent a consensus reached by the Israeli and Palestinian teams.
Nevertheless, specific points of convergence were reached during the
deliberations and some differences were narrowed.
In
actual negotiations, strong political will on the part of the leadership of all
the parties and a viable and sustained negotiating process will be necessary to
help bring the parties to a final agreement. Indeed, no real progress will be
made without the direct and sustained involvement of President Barack Obama,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Special Envoy for Middle East Peace
George J. Mitchell.
In
their capacities as members of the working group, the Israeli and Palestinian
participants, who are well connected to their respective leaderships, did not
represent officially their governments. They are former officials both civilian
and military, academics, experts from various organizations, and individuals
from the private sector. Due to the present status of prospective negotiations,
the participants are constrained in their ability to publicly identify
themselves. In this respect, the proposed territorial options involving a
possible United States bridging proposal are put forward by the Baker Institute
and do not necessarily commit the Israeli and Palestinian teams and individual
participants to specific outcomes.
Edward
P. Djerejian
Founding
Director
James
A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
Rice
University
February
2010
Contents
Foreword,
5
Executive
Summary, 7
Chapter
1: The United StatesÕ Role in Negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian Territorial
Issue, 15
Chapter
2: Guidelines for a United States Strategy to Get to an Israeli- Palestinian
Territorial Agreement, 35
Appendix
I: Palestinian Narrative, 45
Appendix
II: Israeli Narrative, 53
Appendix III: Maps - Israeli and Palestinian
Territorial Proposals, 61
Appendix
IV: Maps - Contested Areas, 71
Appendix
V: Maps - Territorial Options, 99
Acknowledgments,
107